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A second limitation of the data is that it is not able to identify the only reference agreements. This is important because the question of whether the executive agreement should replace the treaty in its entirety is raised only from the perspective of agreements between Congress and the executive branch; it is generally accepted that executive agreements are very different political instruments, which fall under the presidential power and do not require legislative participation. Footnote 81 The reason for the inability to individually identify exclusive executive agreements is that neither TIF nor the executive agreements themselves indicate their licensing rules. Therefore, the identification of exclusive executive agreements would require a search for licensing laws for each executive convention in the Broad Statute, a process that requires an unenforceable workforce and cannot simply be automated. However, previous studies have shown that the share of single executive agreements is minimal, with an estimated share of 5% to 6% in all international agreements. Footnote 83 The analysis below deals with this restriction through a conservative estimation method. Footnote 84 87 A similar argument applies to agreements that are subject to disagreement. Whether an agreement is still actively invoked cannot be respected is a subjective provision and we lack a clear theory as to why the rate of active dependence on inactivity in contracts and executive agreements should be different. 69 See z.B.
U.S. Department of State, A Guide to the United States Treaty in Force, at vii (Igor I. Kavass ed., 2016) (“T] is here a very weak correlation between bilateral and multilateral categories. The existing treaties do not have a numerical list or a list of bilateral and multilateral agreement themes. Nor does it seek to merge agreements in another way, which is comfortable for researchers. »). 66 Martin, supra note 15, at 448 (“Sometimes U.S. allies call for long-standing executive agreements to be turned into formal treaties explicitly stating that such changes would signal long-term U.S. commitment.” Yoo, supra note 16, with 41 (“[T] his reading of the Constitution removes from the nation`s toolbox an instrument that …
the most sustainable international agreements.” Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1316 (“[T]he bar in Congress is generally higher for Article II treaty – which might be thought to create a stronger assurance of political durability.”). 105 For example, HeinOnlines U.S. Treaty s. Treaty s Library provides access to the full text of a large number of international agreements. The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 requires the President to notify the Senate within 60 days of an executive agreement. The president`s powers to conclude such agreements have not been restricted. The reporting requirement allowed Congress to vote in favor of repealing an executive agreement or to refuse funding for its implementation.   On the other hand, opponents of substitutability point to the lack of clear text support. In search of a strict conception of the Constitution, the treaty clause is clear when it comes to making the deliberation and approval of the Senate the exclusive method of approving international agreements. Footnote 32 An alternative view resulting from a more flexible interpretation of the Constitution indicates that both the treaties and executive agreements of Congress have their respective areas of application.